A Tension in the Strong Program: the Relation between the Rational and the Social by Shahryari, Shahram
This is a pre-print version of my paper. The Version of Record of this manuscript will be published in Social Epistemology 





A Tension in the Strong Program: the Relation between 
the Rational and the Social 
Shahram Shahryari 





Advocating a sociological explanation of scientific knowledge, David Bloor protests against 
the adherents of the autonomy of knowledge, i.e. those who asymmetrically explain the 
credibility of theories in the history of science. These philosophers and historians regard the 
credibility of true and rational theories due to their proper reasons, while account for the 
acceptance of false or irrational beliefs by citing social causes. Bloor assumes that the 
credibility of all beliefs is socially influenced, and therefore considers all in need of 
sociological explanation. To substantiate this claim, he argues that all epistemic factors that 
are appealed to in explaining true or rational beliefs are really social. However, this argument 
aligns rational entities with social factors, and thus, undermines the ground of this division. 
Therefore, his prior complaint of the autonomy of knowledge would be invalidated. Hence, 
there is a conflict between Bloor’s objection to the asymmetrical explanation of scientific 
theories and his account of the social construction of epistemic reasons. In this paper, we 
reveal this concealed conflict and attempt to suggest ways to resolve it.  
Keywords The symmetry principle; Substance monism; Social constructivism; Strong 
Program 
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Social constructivists proclaim that the truth, rationality, and success of all beliefs, including 
scientific theories, are socially built. A prominent approach to constructivism which focuses 
particularly on the social study of science is David Bloor’s ‘Strong Program’. Bloor sets out 
powerful arguments in defense of the social construction of epistemic factors and rational 
attributes. His arguments are widely regarded as demonstrating that the rational and the social 
are the same (Kusch 2000, 31-2; Kemp 2003, 312-3; and Seidel 2014, 83) – the view we refer 
to as the monistic conception of this relation or substance monism. 
Another kind of monism appears in the most famous principle of the Strong Program, 
namely ‘the principle of symmetry’.
1
 This principle requires that all beliefs, no matter what 
their value is, should be symmetrically explained, i.e. by causes of one kind (Bloor 1991 
(1976), 7-9). As a result, Bloor stands against the dualism acknowledged by scholars who 
explain true or rational beliefs by epistemic reasons and false or irrational beliefs 
sociologically. He complains about this asymmetrical explanation of science being biased and 
unscientific (ibid, 13). 
The monistic picture reinforces the symmetry principle in one way; since it indicates that 
even arguments themselves are made up of social factors, therefore not only non-rational 
beliefs but also rational beliefs need sociological explanation. However, substance monism 
unexpectedly makes Bloor’s complaint against asymmetrical explanations unfounded in 
another way; for if reasons and arguments are also social, explaining true or rational scientific 
beliefs by reasons and false or non-rational ones by social factors could not be considered 
asymmetrical.  
                                                           
1
 At least once the symmetrical explanation is also called “monism” (Barnes and Boor 1982, 25). Bloor 
therefore speaks of two monisms: explanatory monism and substance monism. However, in order to avoid the 
confusion of the two, by “monism” in the rest of the paper, we only mean the second idea. 
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Opponents and supporters of the program have discussed in detail the principle of 
symmetry, substance monism, and the beneficial relation of it to symmetry; however, their 
detrimental relation has been mostly overlooked. In this paper, we would deal with the 
negative side of the relation and illustrate what limitations substance monism places on the 
Strong Program and Bloor’s criticism of the asymmetrical explanation of scientific theories. 
Although this paper deals exclusively with the Strong Program as stated in Bloor’s work, the 
result can also provide insight into other constructivist approaches to knowledge. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we introduce the principle of 
symmetry and Bloor’s complaint against asymmetrical explanations. In section 3, we present 
Bloor’s attitude toward the social construction of epistemic factors and briefly summarize his 
arguments. In section 4, we demonstrate why the identity of the social and the rational makes 
Bloor’s complaint groundless and creates a conflict in the program. And in section 5, we 
suggest ways to resolve this challenge consistent with the Strong Program’s core insights.  
2. Bloor’s Complaint Submission 
The Strong Program, as  Bloor presents it, seeks to explain all scientific beliefs with social 
causes, regardless of how the analysts evaluate them. To this end, Bloor introduces four 
methodological principles for explaining knowledge, including scientific knowledge, 
according to which sociological explanations must be causal, neutral, symmetrical, and 
reflexive. Therefore, the sociological explanations of science must, respectively, address the 
causes of belief creation, encompass all kinds of beliefs, apply the same types of causes to 
beliefs of any value, and be applicable to the sociology itself (Bloor 1991, 7).  
The most significant and controversial tenet of the Strong Program is the symmetry 
principle, according to which the same type(s) of causes must explain, say, rational beliefs 
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and irrational beliefs.2 Bloor notes that he does not mean that the same causes explain all 
beliefs, rather he regards that the same kinds of causes should explain them (Bloor 2004, 937; 
2011, 6&402). 
Therefore, we can define symmetrical explanations and asymmetrical ones as follows: 
(I) An explanation is symmetrical if it explains rational beliefs and irrational beliefs 
with causes of the same kind and, similarly, asymmetrical explanations involve those 
explanations that cite different types of causes for accepting rational beliefs and irrational 
ones. 
There is a similar symmetry between the explanation of true beliefs and false ones, as well as 
the explanation of successful beliefs and unsuccessful ones (ibid, 7-8). 
The Strong Program, says Bloor, contrasts with the dominant view of historians, 
philosophers and even sociologists who divide beliefs in terms of their evaluation, and 
consider different explanations for each category. They regard the credibility of true, rational, 
and successful beliefs as the result of reasons that demonstrate their truth, rationality, and 
success. On the contrary, why scientists sometimes accept false, irrational or unsuccessful 
beliefs is explained by other factors that made them believable – for instance, with causes of 
economic pressures, political considerations, religious and nationalist prejudices (Bloor 1991, 
8-9).  
Imre Lakatos epitomizes this attitude when he assesses the value of competing scientific 
methodologies in terms of how they can explain the great successes of the history of science. 
In his opinion, each methodology reconstructs the history of science rationally and considers 
                                                           
2
 Although the principle of symmetry is expressed in many different and equivocal ways in Bloor’s works, the 
above version presents its standard and more common form (see: Bloor 1991, 7; 2004, 937; 2011, 6&402). 
Larry Laudan (1981, 182), Tim Lewens (2005, 564) and Jeff Kochan (2008, 22 & 2010, 129), among others, 
have also considered the same formulation as the principle of symmetry. 
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some other scientific events that are not consistent with its methodological principles the 
irrational periods of the history of science. Lakatos asserts that in every rational 
reconstruction of science there will be non-rational parts, which psychological and social 
causes explain their occurrence. He calls the rational part ‘internal history’, and the non-
rational part ‘external history’ of science. Only when no rational reconstruction of them is 
possible, these causal explanations are leveled (Lakatos 1989 (1971), 118-20). 
Bloor sometimes refers to this approach to the explanation of scientific theories as ‘the 
autonomy of knowledge’ (Bloor 1991, 8) or ‘the teleological view’ (ibid, 11) and considers it 
“the extreme form of asymmetry” (ibid, 13). Accordingly, whether beliefs with different 
values are explained by causes of the same kind draws a decisive line that makes the 
explanations of the Strong Program symmetrical and separates Bloor’s approach in 
explaining beliefs from that of the so-called rationalists or adherents of the autonomy of 
knowledge who first evaluate beliefs, and then explain beliefs that are positively valued, 
different from beliefs that are valued negatively. So, “[t]he general structure of these 
explanations”, says Bloor, “stands out clearly”: 
They all divide behaviour or belief into two types: right and wrong, true or 
false, rational or irrational. They then invoke sociological or psychological 
causes to explain the negative side of the division. Such causes explain error, 
limitation and deviation. The positive side of the evaluative divide is quite 
different. Here logic, rationality and truth appear to be their own 
explanation. Here psycho-social causes do not need to be invoked (ibid, 9).  
Hereupon, one can comprehensibly see that: 
(II) Explaining true or rational beliefs with epistemic reasons and false or irrational 
beliefs with social causes is an asymmetrical explanation. 
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Although Bloor accepts (II), he constantly objects to explaining scientific theories 
asymmetrically. This kind of explanation is found guilty of betrayal to scientific values and 
the approach of empirical sciences (ibid, 13); since “[i]f explanation is allowed to hinge on 
prior evaluations” Bloor asserts “then the causal processes that are thought to operate in the 
world will come to reflect the pattern of these evaluations”; therefore, it loses the moral 
impartiality required by scientific research (ibid). Thus, it can be said that while teleological 
explanations of scientific knowledge presuppose its correctness and regard it as the criterion 
of distinction in explanation, the Strong Program’s symmetrical explanations stems from the 
awareness that due to the defeasibility of our current theories, they cannot be a reliable 
criterion for the type of explanation. Therefore, the rationale behind the symmetry principle is 
that sociologists, as analysts of scientific knowledge, should “separate the world from the 
actor’s description”; so they do not take for granted what is the topic of their inquiry (Bloor 
1999, 93). 
In short, Bloor’s complaint to advocates of the autonomy of knowledge is that their 
explanation of scientific knowledge is discriminatory: due to their prejudices, they utilize 
different kinds of causes explaining beliefs.
 
To put it more precisely, Bloor’s criticism is not 
why they regard rational and social explanations as two different kinds;
3
 rather, it is why, by 
their assumptions, they use two different types of cause, i.e. rational type and social type, to 
explain scientific theories. 
3. Bloor’s View on the Social Construction of Epistemic Reasons 
To establish the symmetry principle in the sociological studies of science, Bloor puts forward 
strong arguments to demonstrate that social causes and factors play an undeniable role in the 
credibility of all beliefs, even rationally justified ones, and therefore all of them require 
                                                           
3
 There are a few exceptions in his more recent works that we will address. 
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sociological explanation. His arguments indicate that social factors play a constructive role 
for epistemic reasons or rational and logical principles. So, our rationality, accordingly, is 
made up or constituted or constructed of social factors. That is to say, “epistemic factors are 
really social factors” (Bloor 1984, 297). 
According to Bloor, reasons and inferences are not understandable “without appreciating 
their dependence on patterns of training, conventions of use, and the precise historical 
circumstances that attend their employment” (Bloor 1984, 298). Bloor adds “[t]here is 
nothing else which, so to speak, lies behind our reasoning, to which our rational steps must 
correspond or have reference” (ibid). It follows that the rationality of a belief, in the sense of 
believing it for reason, underpins the influence of social factors in its credibility. We will 
touch upon his arguments below to illustrate how, in his view, social factors construct 
rational or epistemic factors. 
One of Bloor’s most important arguments for revealing the constitutive role of social 
factors in rational reasoning draws on the underdetermination of theory by evidence. On this 
ground, he argues that the evidence never specifies the theory and any amount of empirical 
evidence is consistent with several theories. He (with Barry Barnes) argues that evidencing 
reasons are, above all, socially variable; since, “something is only evidence for something 
else when set in the context of assumptions which give it meaning…” (Barnes and Bloor 
1982, 28-9). Therefore, it is only by attaching the scientists’ assumptions that evidence can 
determine one of the rival theories as more empirically supported. These assumptions are 
rooted in scientists’ interests (Bloor 1981, 203-4). Further, as to what is considered evidence, 
there is no rule or obvious way to decide, nor any higher court than the consensus of the 
scientific community (Bloor 2004, 931). 
The same is true of what are called ‘formal’ or ‘extra-empirical’ criteria for the best 
explanation – simplicity, consistency and the like. There is a discrepancy between 
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philosophers on these criteria as well as how they are discerned. From the sociologist’s point 
of view, choosing a criterion by a scientist is not the end of the story; since this decision itself 
demands an explanation too: why is this criterion espoused not another? It is only the 
consensus of experts, as a social causal factor, that will give the definitive answer to this 
question (Bloor 1981, 201-2).  
Likewise, any theory can be sustained by adding some appropriate auxiliary assumptions. 
Only the tradition that the scientist operates within “limits the acceptable interpretations 
which can be put on the facts of experience” and thereby defines what normal science is. 
Therefore, only within a tradition, scientists can decide whether the occurrence of an 
unforeseen phenomenon crucially defeats the theory in question (Bloor 1981, 202). As a 
result, “credibility only makes sense when the scientist’s behaviour is set in its social 
context” (Bloor 2004, 921-3). 
Thus, although Bloor often disregards the various divisions of the underdetermination 
thesis and does not refer to recent discussions about it, his points are sufficiently impressive. 
In spite of some criticisms (Laudan 1990, 289-291), Bloor neither considers 
underdetermination per se as implying the presence of social factors in the credibility of 
beliefs, nor reduces rationality to deductive logic, nor interrupts the connection between 
beliefs and evidence. He, instead, argues for the sociality of the evidential relation and 
demonstrates that scientists’ criteria for inferring the best explanation and also their standards 
for confining the scope of plausible theories are social phenomena as well. The presence of 
the social factors in rational beliefs is more clearly seen in another argument, sometimes 
traces the argument from underdetermination.  
This argument resides in a theory called ‘finitism’, according to which words do not have 
predetermined meanings; meanings are created through a process of collective decision-
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making. This unstable and continued-creation
4
 collective process provides the norm that 
determines what is right and wrong for future cases. Consider when a scientist is supposed to 
follow a rule. The limited cases of following the rule given to them cannot determine how 
they should act on the new case in the same way; since nothing in all respects resembles 
anything else. The degree of similarity and its adequacy and relevance needs to be judged by 
criteria which are generally accepted. So it is the users’ consensus that determines how to 
follow the rule in the new cases. This indicates that the only fact that determines the correct 
way to follow the rule is social reality (Barnes et al. 1996, 55; Bloor 1997, 36-7; 2011, 407-
9). 
What is said about following the rule, also applies to whether or not a concept applies to 
an object. In the way of categorization of objects, there is no fact outside the community that 
reveals the truth or falsity of the classification. Also, whether the statement corresponds to the 
reality and is therefore true or does not fit and is false, there is no reference other than 
consensus among scientists that appears throughout their debates, e.g. in textbook tables, or 
the manner in which qualified individuals practice (Bloor 2007, 272; 2008, 21f).  
These intend that scientists only learn, accept and apply these assumptions by implication. 
So in their view, these implicit presuppositions constitute part of the scientific rationality that 
they have subscribed to. Nevertheless, from sociologist’s point of view, the admission of 
these draws on the pursuit of the community’s goals, interests, and so on. Therefore, what the 
actor considers the criteria of rationality is, for the analyst, a sign of the presence of social 
interests. 
The conclusion of all these remarks is not that scientific beliefs are deprived of good 
reasons or any method is as plausible as any other method, but rather that their own 
rationality is configured by social factors. Bloor interprets this relation by saying that rational 
                                                           
4
 The term is borrowed from Kusch (2002, 200-1). 
This is a pre-print version of my paper. The Version of Record of this manuscript will be published in Social Epistemology 





causes are “really nothing more than a species of social causes”. This means that the “dualism 
of rational and sociological causes, which allegedly compete or alternate with one another, or 
supplement one another” is spurious. The end result is that “[t]here will be no duality of 
rational and social causes”. In contrast, a monist view of the relation between the rational and 
the social is substantiated (Bloor 2011, 406). So Bloor says: 
Supporters of the Strong Programme have always opposed the assumption 
that the rational and the social are fundamentally different in their nature…. 
The programme was formulated in opposition to those who would erect a 
fundamental dualism of the rational and the social. In this sense it expresses 
a form of monism… (Bloor 2007, 223). 
Consequently, Bloor again attributes those like Mannheim, Merton, Lakatos and Laudan to a 
tradition that espouses a dualism of the rational and the social, or the distinction between the 
internal and external history of science. He runs to the contrary: 
All of the different developments in the sociology of scientific knowledge, 
whether contemporary laboratory studies, or sociologically informed 
historical work, have been devoted to overcoming this dualistic, indeed 
Manichean, conception of knowledge (Bloor 2004, 920). 
In the relevant literature, this view is referred to as ‘monism’ or ‘identity of the rational 
and the social’.
5
 Martin Kusch, a contributor to the sociology of scientific knowledge, 
acknowledges this monism and expounds it. Calling the claim that “all ‘rational entities’ 
(arguments, theories, reasons) are social entities” sociologism (Kusch 1999, 177, 182-3; 2000 
ix & 30), Kusch argues that sociologism can be interpreted in different ways. He declares that 
in a personal communication, Bloor has committed himself to reductive sociologism that 
                                                           
5
 One should be aware that type-identity is at stake here, not token-identity. For, as we have already seen in 
section 2, Bloor denies explicitly the token-identity even for social causes themselves. 
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draws upon the assumption that every kind of rational entities is identical with a kind of 
social beings. Socio-rational laws express the identity between these two kinds of identities, 
e.g. arguments of type ‘A’ are acceptable in a social structure of type ‘S’ (Kusch 1999, 183-4; 
2000, 31-2). However, Kusch suggests that Bloor’s work is best treated as part and parcel of 
anomalous sociologism. This view conceptualizes the rational as supervening on the social, in 
the sense that it identifies historically situated rational elements with historically situated 
social institutions while denies the possibility of strict ratio-social (type-type) laws (Kusch 
1999, 184-5; 2000, 32). 
 In a similar vein, Stephen Kemp interprets the relation between social interests and 
success of science in the Strong Program in the same way and refers to it by ‘unification’ and 
‘monism’. He mainly focuses on the Strong Program’s theory of classification, i.e. finitism, 
to demonstrate how the pursuit of interests is seen in this program as instrumental success 
(Kemp 2003). Although speaking of the success of science, his discussion is very close to the 
social construction of rationality; that is how finitism provides evidence for the theory’s 
correspondence with reality or prevents its rejection in the face of unexpected phenomena. 
Markus Seidel, a staunch critic of the Strong Program, coincides with this comprehending 
of the relation, after a discussion of how social factors constitute rational arguments 
conforming to the Strong Program (Seidel 2014, 83-5). He quotes part of Bloor’s statement in 
reply to Ernan McMullin:  
I wish to challenge this picture by arguing that epistemic factors are really 
social factors. The dichotomy that McMullin uses to give structure to his 
scheme seems to me a false one (Bloor 1984, 297). 
Seidel’s discussion leads to the view that in the Strong Program, epistemic factors are not 
replaced by social factors but are themselves social factors (Seidel 2014, 83).  
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So, given the previous discussion, Bloor’s view on this issue is often construed by the pros 
and cons that rational factors and social causes are united and unified. We can put this 
monistic picture of their relation in a nutshell: 
 (III) The social and the rational are entities of the same type. 
In the end, nevertheless, we will say that another interpretation is also possible for the 
construction of the rational by the social, which, although it may not be easy to reconcile with 
some of Bloor’s remarks, is at least free from the problem which we shall now raise. 
4. The Emergence of Conflict 
So far we have said that, first, Bloor complains about the asymmetrical explanation of 
scientific knowledge; that is, he opposes to explain rational scientific beliefs by reasons and 
others by social causes. In addition, he, along with associates such as Kusch, considers the 
epistemic factors, including evidence, arguments and discussions among scientists to be 
social. The latter provides the basis for the former; for it indicates that social factors are also 
effective in the credibility of well-justified beliefs. Thus, the same type of cause, i.e. social 
cause, symmetrically explains all beliefs. 
The second point, however, has a dire consequence: it makes Bloor’s protest against the 
advocates of the autonomy of knowledge meaningless. He attacked them for their 
asymmetrical explanations: explaining true or rational beliefs by epistemic reasons, while 
attributing false or irrational beliefs to social factors; thereby Bloor invited these analysts to 
symmetrical explanations. Nonetheless, it now turns out that those so-called epistemic 
reasons falls into the category of the social, and therefore rational and social entities are of 
the same kind. So the question arises, what the objection is to advocates of the autonomy of 
knowledge and to their historiography of science. Although they explain rational scientific 
beliefs by epistemic reasons and others by social causes, since the rational and the social are 
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ultimately the same, they have effectively explained both with the very same type of causes: 
social causes. Stated differently, the identity of the rational and the social, challenges Bloor’s 
previous claim that rational and social causes are typically different. Thus, in the light of 
monistic comprehension of the above relation, his complaint of asymmetrical explanation 
seems to be no longer grounded.  
But the problem is not only that Bloor’s protest is unfounded, the problem is far greater; 
there is a conflict in his claims by admitting that rational causes are social causes. For, on the 
one hand, Bloor considers the rational and the social two different types (and precisely for 
this reason, he calls the explanations based on them asymmetrical), and on the other hand, he 
considers them of the same type. The first consideration is obviously at odds with the second 
one. Notice that, unfortunately, none of Kusch’s different versions of sociologism can solve 
the problem either; for in all of them, in spite of the difference in the relation between the 
rational and the social, these two entities were conceived substantively one and the same by 
definition. Therefore, although sociologism of one sort or another may accurately describe 
Bloor’s views on the relation of the rational and the social, his objection to the asymmetrical 
explanation calls for a substantive distinction between the two. 
To make it clearer, let us formulate the conflict appeared in Bloor’s claims in line with the 
results obtained in the previous sections: 
(I) Asymmetrical explanations are those explanations that involve different types of causes 
for accepting rational beliefs and irrational ones. (And similarly, symmetrical explanations 
are those explanations that include causes of one type for the credibility of rational beliefs 
and irrational ones.) 
(II) Explaining true or rational beliefs with rational causes and false or irrational beliefs 
with social causes is an asymmetrical explanation. 
(III) Social causes and rational causes are entities of the same type. 
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From (I) and (II) it follows deductively that: 
(IV) Explaining true or rational beliefs with rational causes and false or irrational beliefs 
with social causes involves different types of causes. 
This means: 
(V) Social causes and rational causes are different types of entities. 
However, (III) and (V) patently contradict each other.  
Contrary to what one might think, both premises of the deduction, (I) and (II), are Bloor’s 
own statements and there is no confusion of Bloor’s claims with that of his opponents’. Since 
the argument consisting of (I) and (II) simply expresses Bloor’s view of asymmetry and never 
commits him to asymmetrical explanations, any doubts about the veracity of the premises are 
eliminated. As for the form of the argument, it is clearly a valid deduction. So the argument is 
undoubtedly sound. 
 
The second possible criticism is that just because two explanations are fundamentally 
different does not mean that the causes cited are also of two different types. Therefore, the 
critique continues, since sociological and rational explanations are different in type does not 
require that social causes and rational causes to be two different types. So there is no conflict 
between the identity of the rational and the social, and regarding explanations based on them 
as different kinds of explanation.  
This objection also seems to rest on a misunderstanding. The revocation of the alleged 
requirement may be correct, but it has nothing to do with our argument. True, just because 
social and rational explanations are two different kinds, does not contradict Bloor’s another 
claim that the social and the rational are of the same kind. However, here is another premise 
left out by the critic, and that is Bloor’s assertion’s that asymmetrical explanations are those 
that cite different types of causes for theories evaluated differently (recall I). That the 
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asymmetrical explanations are based on different types of causes – and therefore the social 
and the rational are of two different kinds – thus directly drive from Bloor’s own remarks and 
is not presumed in our argument. So the conflict in question really exists. 
As the third objection to the argument, one may resort to the idea of finitism saying that 
categorization is the subject of experts’ consensus and therefore varies depending on the 
culture and context. Put differently, classifying things as rational or social is a matter of 
contingency, not necessity. So, the critic goes on, whether social and rational entities are of 
the same type has no single universal answer. In one area they may be considered to be of the 
same type by the experts’ agreement, and in another they may not be due to a different 
agreement. In any case, there is no context-independent answer to this question.  
Alas, considering that this conflict is the result of a deduction, both premises of which are 
Bloor’s own remarks makes this defense frustrating. In other terms, no matter where he came 
up with the criteria for this division, it is Bloor himself that sees the social and the rational as 
different types – this is where he calls explanations based on them asymmetrical (e.g. Bloor 
2011: 400-1) – but simultaneously regards them as the same type – where he speaks of the 
social construction of knowledge (e.g. ibid, 409-10).  
Finally, one may wonder how a methodological principle, the symmetry tenet, might 
conflict with an ontological position, such as substance monism. These are on two different 
levels and talk about two different categories of things: while the former speaks of the 
method of sociological explanation, the latter speaks of the entities that exist in the world. So, 
continues the critic, despite the soundness of the argument, there must be something wrong 
here.  
But this response cannot resist the argument either; since it relies on confusion. To be 
more precise, this is not the symmetry principle itself, which conflicts with substance 
monism, but the presuppositions underlying this principle; i.e. the relation it expresses 
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between sociological explanations and rational ones. Let us return to the formulation of the 
argument: (I) and (II) are in conflict with (III); (III) expresses substance monism, but (I) and 
(II) do not represent the symmetry principle; they do not state any methodological 
instructions to the effect that the explanation should be symmetrical. Instead, they assert a 
dichotomy between two types of entities. As a result, here an ontological proposition about 
the relation of the rational to the social contradicts another ontological proposition in that 
same regard, not a methodological principle on how to explain scientific knowledge. Hence, 
the critic’s surprise is misplaced. 
5. Some Possible Ways to Resolve the Conflict 
Although we think our argument for this conflict is conclusive, it does not mean that it 
fundamentally destroys the Strong Program. There may still be some different comprehension 
of the relation between the rational and the social consistent with Bloor’s perception of 
asymmetry or there may be some other solutions that, despite some minor variations in the 
face of this challenge, retain the core insights of the program. In this section, we will discuss 
some possible solutions. 
The first proposal that may resolve this conflict is to remove one of the parties in terms of 
Bloor’s intellectual development. For this purpose, one may claim that his thinking has 
undergone some changes, so that one of the two ideas, i.e. the asymmetry of rational causes 
and social causes or their substantive monism, has been abandoned. This claim is not entirely 
irrelevant. Although Bloor himself never explicitly acknowledged such a conversion, 
following the historical course of his thought reveals that he has changed his mind over time. 
In his early works, Bloor objects to the asymmetry of the rational and the social, but in more 
recent works, he says his protest has always been against the disparity between the two. For 
instance, he states that philosophers of science, like Lakatos and Laudan, “treat rational 
processes as fundamentally distinct from the nexus of sociopsychological causes” (Bloor 
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2011, 488) (Emphasis added). In some of his writings, including the one quoted earlier, Bloor 
says that the Strong Program has “always opposed the assumption that the rational and the 
social are fundamentally different in their nature” and thus, the program is “formulated in 
opposition to those who would erect a fundamental dualism of the rational and the social” 
(Bloor 2007, 223). These quotations may suggest that Bloor abandoned his earlier claim that 
rational explanations and sociological explanations are asymmetrical, not the principle of 
symmetry itself. In so doing, he can retain claim (I) and reject claim (II).  
But this proposal faces two problems: First, admitting this conversion, the question arises 
as to what is the ‘asymmetrical explanation’ Bloor continues to speak out against in his later 
writings. For instance, when he says that the scientific controversy between the British and 
the Germans can be explained both symmetrically and asymmetrically (2011, 401), what may 
he mean by ‘asymmetrical explanation’?  
Second, according to this method of conflict resolution, the valuation-based historiography 
that has always been attacked by Bloor and his colleagues must also be approved; since in the 
last analysis, it also explains both categories of beliefs, i.e. rational and irrational, by the same 
kind of causes. Thus, for instance, Bloor’s sociological account of the history of aircraft in 
both Germany and Britain in his Enigma of the Airfoil (2011) is as legitimate as a Whig 
account of this scientific controversy. Therefore, a Lakatoshian historian can also explain the 
rivalry in terms of the distinction between internal and external history; so citing internal 
factors, the historian can say that the Germans admitted the circularity theory because of their 
superior rationality or having good reason; while explaining the British’s acceptance of 
discontinuity theory by referring to some external elements – e.g. their economic pressures or 
implausible philosophical attitudes, etc. – that clouds their judgments. Note that these two 
problems are independent of each other: by rejecting (II), Bloor may still be able to make 
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some sense of ‘asymmetrical explanation’, but this does not solve the problem of legitimizing 
it.  
To dispel these two objections, the best way is to modify claim (I) by saying that pursuant 
to Bloor’s converted view, rational explanations and sociological explanations are not two 
different types but two different classes. The suggestion is that scientific explanation is 
hierarchical; sociological explanations and rational ones are at different levels. Therefore, 
Bloor’s use of the term ‘asymmetrical explanation’ is still permissible and his critique of the 
historiography of the proponents of the autonomy of knowledge is as yet valid. 
Correspondingly, the asymmetry mentioned in Bloor’s protest to rationalists must be 
understood in the sense that their explanation is multiple. So the rational and the social are 
considered, accordingly, two levels of one kind, not two different kinds – so, the first 
problem is warded off. Now, what is wrong with multiple explanations? The problem with 
this sort of explanation is that it does not reflect all aspects of the story; since one side 
(rational theories) is explained at an early stage and the other (irrational ones) by explanations 
at a deeper level. So there would be a kind of imbalance in the explanation. Another 
disadvantage of asymmetrical explanations – in the new sense that the explanation is multiple 
– is that it may insinuate that social causes and factors have no place in the credibility of true 
and rational beliefs. So the second objection is also prevented.  
Another and more original way to evade the conflict, without changing the meaning of 
symmetry or abandoning the objection to rationalists, is to interpret the constructive relation 
between the social and the rational in a way other than their identity. To this end, Bloor’s 
arguments for the construction of epistemic reasons by social factors must be taken to 
establish the view that social factors constitute epistemic factors partially, not totally. 
Consequently, these arguments, despite defending the presence of social factors in all beliefs 
and thus providing a justification for symmetrical explanation in the social studies of science, 
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would not imply that epistemic reasons are entirely social factors. Therefore, by upholding 
the symmetry principle, the unity of the social and the rational can be discarded. 
All we needed to get rid of the mentioned conflict was an explanation that maintaining the 
construction of the rational from the social preserves the type-difference between the two. 
Comprehending social causes as part of the construction of rational causes provides us with 
such an explanation. This picture, therefore, replaces (III) with another premise (III') in 
which: 
 (III') Social factors and rational factors are not entities of the same type. 
Since the identity claim between the two is no more assumed in the new argument, conflict 
will no longer lies in the premises. This solution also does not incur the costs and problems of 
the previous proposal: here, first, the construction of epistemic reasons with social causes is 
fully preserved; but since this does not imply their unification, the asymmetry of explanations 
based on the two factors also makes sense. Therefore, this interpretation, while rejecting the 
monistic picture, rehabilitates the Strong Program without impairing its underlying principles.  
One might be tempted to say that Bloor expresses the same idea when he says: science “… 
cannot be called ‘purely’ sociological any more than it is ‘purely’ psychological or ‘purely’ a 
matter of grappling with the world” (2011, 402); or when he denies that the word ‘strong’ in 
the label of the ‘Strong Program’ is to mean that “nothing but society acts as a significant 
cause of belief and the material world and sensory-motor experience play no significant role” 
(2014, 405). This reservation has been accompanied the Strong Program since its beginning; 
as introducing its four principles in Knowledge and Social Imagery, Bloor mentions under the 
principle of causality that “[n]aturally there will be other types of causes apart from social 
ones which will cooperate in bringing about belief” (1991, 7).  
But for some reason, we should resist this temptation. First, there is no doubt that Bloor 
contradicted himself by saying that sociological explanation and rational one are 
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asymmetrical, while at the same time stating that epistemic reasons are nothing but a species 
of social factors or that they are of the same kind. Second, the subject of these quotations is 
knowledge, not epistemic reasons; and these two are certainly not one thing. Bloor may 
believe that reasoning, justification, proofs, etc., are all merely made up of social factors, but 
other things also play a role in the construction of knowledge. The conclusion is that what he 
says about the construction of knowledge is not necessarily correct about the construction of 
epistemic reasons. Taking this point into account, the Strong Program, as stated by Bloor, is 
committed to the view that social factors constitute rational factors utterly, and thus the two 
will be the same. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we indicated that social constructivists’ claim that rational or epistemic factors 
are really social has its limitations. Holding this view does not allow us to regard rational 
explanations and sociological causal explanations asymmetrical; i.e. based on two distinct 
types of cause. So we have to adjust at least one of these two theses.  
If we preserve the identity of the rational and the social, then the claim of asymmetry 
between these two must either be abandoned or construed in a different sense; it could, for 
example, mean that these are explanations at two different levels, not different types of 
explanation. However, if we are to see rational explanations and sociological explanations as 
two different kinds, then the social construction of the rational should be construed in a sense 
other than their unity. Thus, one can say that social factors but partially constitute rational 
factors. Although Bloor is occasionally explicit in stating their unity, his arguments for 
constructing the rational from the social seem to be consistent with both partial and general 
readings. So, it is not unlikely that he also had non-monistic understanding of the social 
construction of rationality and epistemic reasons, and those statements opposed to this 
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interpretation are negligence or merely linguistic slips. Whit this being the case, Bloor must 
state what he considers to be involved in the construction of epistemic reasons other than 
social factors. Then, the monistic interpretation, it could be said, stems mainly from the 
emphasis of his commentators, not his own.  
Although incompatible with some of Bloor’s wordings, these two amendments retains 
both symmetry as the most pivotal principle in the Strong Program, and the constitution of 
the rational by the social that underpins the symmetrical sociological explanation of beliefs.  
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